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ISSUES IN ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW:
DRAFTING IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR ANTICORRUPTION CONVENTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE
AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Bryane Michael, Stockholm School of Economics
INTRODUCrION

For over ten years, organizations such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations
have been helping developing countries adopt legal measures to fight
corruption. The various anti-corruption conventions signed by a wide number
of countries represent perhaps the most common element of such work. 1 Yet,
the adoption of the anti-corruption conventions has had a questionable impact
on reducing corruption. Indeed, the limited empirical studies available point to
little, if any, correlation between the extent to which several Central and
Eastern European countries have adopted conventions against corruption and
reductions in perceived corruption levels in that country. 2 Qualitative studies of
work on anti-corruption from the region also fail to find any significant
relationship between the adoption of legislation aimed at reducing corruption
and more corruption related detections and prosecutions. 3While ratified by
national parliaments, these anti-corruption laws are not being implemented in
executive agencies most prone to corruption -particularly the traffic police, the
1. Each of these organizations have promulgated numerous conventions introducing
provisions with the aim of reducing corruption. For example, the Council of Europe has
promulgated at least 4 conventions aimed at fighting corruption -- a criminal law convention,
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, January 27, 1999, ETS No. 173, a civil law convention,
Civil Law Convention on Corruption of 1999, ETS No. 174, a convention on international legal
assistance in criminal matters, Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, ETS No. 93, and
a convention on the confiscation of the proceeds of crimes such as corruption, Convention on
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of
Terrorism, ETS No. 198. The UN and OECD also have encouraged the adoption of a number of
conventions and recommendations. A detailed discussion of these conventions would take this
paper well outside its main argument and I refer the reader to Professor Henning's paper for a
background on these conventions. Peter Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of
InternationalCorruption Conventions and United States, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 793 (2001).
2. For one such study, see Franklin Steves & Alan Rousso, Anti-CorruptionProgrammesin PostCommunist Transition Countries and Changes in the Business Environment, 1999-2002 (Eur. Bank for
Reconstruction
&
Dev.,
Working
Paper
85,
2003),
available
at
http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/wp0085.pdf.
3. See generally JAMES ANDERSON AND CHERYL GRAY, WORLD BANK, ANTI-CORRUPI'ON IN
TRANSITION
3:
WHO
IS
SUCCEEDING... AND
WHY?
(2006),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources/ACT3.pdf; Frank Emmert, Administrative
and Court Reform in Centraland Eastern Europe, 9 EURO. L. J. 3 (2003).
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police, customs, and tax inspectors.
Figure 1: Adoption of Anti-Corruption Conventions and Control
of Corruption
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Using a law and economics approach to anti-corruption regulation, this
paper seeks to provide an answer to the following question: "how should
executive agencies in many Central European and Former Soviet countries
write anti-corruption regulations?" Executive agencies should write
regulations, using economic theory as a guide, such that the social benefits of
anti-corruption regulation outweigh the social costs. The first .section of this
paper will address the importance of anti-corruption regulation -showing why
anti-corruption legal work has not yet succeeded-and the reasons why the
current "let's regulate" approach may be ill-conceived, because such an
approach ignores the costs and benefits of regulation. The second section deals
with the assignment of liability for corruption offences -showing how the
allocation of liability should follow the cost-benefit principle applied in this
paper. The third part of the paper looks at the financing of anti-corruption
work, showing how to provide incentives to encourage corruption fighters to
work harder and whistleblowers to blow the whistle. The fourth section looks
at the issue of jurisdiction, showing how the assignment of the prosecution of
non-criminal corruption cases to various government agencies. can speed up
processing times and decrease processing costs. The fifth section provides the
rationale for using regulatory instruments as a strong complement to the
legislative approach (namely just implementing more detailed anti-corruption
acts). The final section recaps the argument that anti-corruption regulations that
implement the international anti-corruption conventions and national
legislation should generate positive social welfare (namely, their benefits
should exceed their costs). Given the newness of the topic (and space
limitations), the paper provides a particularly polemic approach to the topic leaving a more balanced and critical review of the topics for future work.
THE IMPORTANCE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION REGULATION

The question of anti-corruption regulation raises immense interest in
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policymaking circles because the current approach is not working well for most
of Eastern Europe. Figure 1 plots a variable which Steves and Rousso use to
measure the extent to which several Central and Eastern European countries
have adopted anti-corruption conventions against the extent to which "public
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption." 4 As shown in comparison (by a widely cited variable which
Kaufmann et al. refer to as "control of corruption") - which is a rank list of
countries according to the perceived effectiveness of executive agencies in
fighting corruption-this figure shows no correlation across countries between
the extent to which a country adopts anti-corruption conventions and the
ability of its public administrators to fight against corruption. 5 Indeed, if a
general trend is discernible in the data, public administrations of countries who
have adopted anti-corruption conventions tend to be more affected by
corruption.
Figure 2: The Distortionary Effects of Anti-Corruption
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A main reason for the under-effectiveness of these laws rests in the fact
that, while being ratified by national parliaments, legislation is not being
implemented in executive agencies most prone to corruption -particularly
traffic police, the police, customs, and tax inspection agencies. Executive
agency-level implementation - in the form implementing regulations - has not
occurred in many Eastern European countries for (at least) two reasons. First,
the development and application of many of the legal principles that help

4. DANIEL KAUFMANN ET AL., WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE
INDIVIDUAL
GOVERNANCE
INDICATORS
FOR
1996-2005,

MATTERS: AGGREGATE AND
4
(2006),
available
at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/ Resources/17404791150 40 2 582 3 5 7 / 2 661829-1158008871017/gov matters_5_noannex.pdf.
5. Id. at 38.
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insure civil servant accountability (and that prosecutors or instructing judges
rely upon in trial) remains less advanced than in developed Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries. In these underdeveloped countries, resort to civil law, administrative law, criminal law, and
contract law is difficult and costly. Unlike in OECD countries, in cases where
the law is silent, no jurisprudential tradition helps inform public administrators
(or the administrative judges who must decide on the legality of their decisions)
6
to make the decisions that contribute to an effective "stock" of regulation.
Second, the provisions in these conventions often do not take into account the
political or economic costs involved in implementing the provisions of the anticorruption laws these countries ratify. Many of the points-related to the
criminalization of bribery, the cleaning of party finance, and international asset
seizure-prove expensive to implement and run against the interests of
7
parliamentarians or executive agencies.
As Eastern European countries begin to draft and adopt implementing
regulations for international anti-corruption conventions, an incentive-based
approach to fighting corruption will produce superior results to an approach
based on ad-hoc regulations because regulations distort both the public and private
sectors.8 In many cases, coordination or cooperation failures between civil
servants create situations where executive regulation can improve productivity
in anti-corruption work.9 However, as shown in Figure 2, in many cases, these
regulations fail to stop the behaviour they target while simultaneously
introducing a wide range of real costs (such as monitoring and enforcement
costs) and economic costs (tied to the opportunity cost of doing something else).
These anti-corruption regulations, which often create a divergence between
actions the civil servant would normally take and the action he or she is
required to take, will detract the civil servant's attention from other (potentially
more productive) tasks.' 0 Anti-corruption regulations cost money-money

6. Explaining the existence of legislation and regulatory instruments as the result of costs and
benefits represents a fascinating (and under-developed) area of legal scholarship. For more on the
costs of bringing various cases to trial, see Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q. J. ECON. 453 (2003).
7. At the risk of appearing immodest, Prof. Kasemets and I sketch these arguments in an
earlier paper. Bryane Michael & Aare Kasemets, The Role of Incentive Design in ParliamentaryAntiCorruptionProgrammes,13 J. LEGIS. STuD. 280 (2007).
8. Many executive agencies in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union have chosen to
fight corruption through the adoption of agency-level codes of conduct, conflict of interest rules,
asset declaration rules, and broader party finance reform (among the literally hundreds of other
executive level regulations ranging from the amount of money civil servants are allowed to carry in
their pockets to the number of receipts they must produce for work-related expenses). Passing a
regulation represents an instinctive and visceral reaction to a problem in the public sector. For an
extremely insightful view of such a phenomenon in a US perspective, see FRANK ANECHIARICO &
JAMES B JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY: How CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES
GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE (1996).

9. I do not address the role of the corruption of the regulatory structures themselves -or the
regulator's role in combating such corruption. For a broader expos6, see Anthony Ogus, Corruption
and Regulatory Structures, 26 L. & Pol'y 329 (2004).
10. All regulation is not harmful; as regulations prohibiting civil servants from collecting bribes
clearly detracts the civil servant's interests away from such activities and increases overall
productivity. However, regulations which force the civil servant to engage in filling out paperwork
or change work location every 6 months Oust for the sake of doing so) clearly imposes costs which
may be larger than the gains from reducing corruption.
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required to talk about them, to write them down and to implement them. These
regulations can often distort markets, not only because they restrict civil
servants' freedom of movement but also because they impose an extra tax
burden on society. A departmental regulation aimed at reducing corruption must
balance the corruption reducing effects that rule will have with the distortionaryeffects
on the public management environment and private markets. 1
In Eastern Europe, executive agencies are rapidly adopting anti-corruption
regulations that may be more distortionary than socially productive. Figure 3
shows simple statistics summarizing the extent and impact of many anticorruption regulations in the Eastern European and Former Soviet region. 12 In
several of the Nice accession round countries (Hungary, Poland, Latvia, and
Lithuania), executive agencies have already been writing regulations that adopt
EU decisions or help these agencies comply with acquis obligations.13 Recent
accession round countries (Romania and Bulgaria) have only started to come to
terms with many of the regulatory principles that are common to the older EU
member states. 14 Several former Soviet states (Armenia, Georgia, and Russia)
predictably still-despite years of consultants' advice-have not established a
relatively well-founded regulatory base, owing in part to numerous revisions in
their anti-corruption legislation. In cases where regulations have been adopted
in these former Soviet countries, they often impose more social costs than
benefits-reflecting reliance on the "stick" of administrative punishments
instead of the "carrot" of civil servant incentives.

11. As this is a paper on the legal aspects of anti-corruption regulation, I ignore the obvious
observation that regulation must also seek to promote justice.
12. A consistent (and convincing) measure of law enforcement institutions remains sorely
lacking in the field of law and economics. For recent attempts, see generally Maria Dakolias,
Methods for Monitoring and Evaluating the Rule of Law, in APPLYING THE "SECTORAL APPROACH" TO
THE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DOMAIN 9 (Ctr. for Int'l Cooperation ed. 2005) 2005, available at
http://www.cilc.nll/Conferencepublication_2005.pdf.
13. Unfortunately, the most recent comparative analysis of legal work on anti-corruption policy
in the region derives from an Open Society Institute study from 2002. OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE,
MONITORING THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS: CORRUPrION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY (2002),
availableat http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/corruption.
14. In 2007, the Commission found numerous shortcomings with both Romania's and
Bulgaria's adoption of measures aimed at reducing corruption. Press Release, European Union, Key
Findings of the Progress Report on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism with Bulgaria
(June 27, 2007),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/261&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; Press Release, European Union, Key Findings of the Progress
Report on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism with Romania (June 27, 2007), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/262&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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Figure 3: Estimates of Anti-Corruption Regulatory Impacts on Eastern
European and Former Soviet Countries
Country
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Such data show that right-regulating is clearly more important than under
or over-regulating. More regulation does not produce more effective reductions
in corruption (as Figure 1 showed at an international level). Instead, anticorruption regulations should be incentive compatible-creating incentives for
civil servants to follow them. Regulations should allocate liability (or legal
responsibility for damages arising from corruption) to civil servants in such a
way so that civil servants have the incentive to avoid corrupt situations as well
as to report potential corruption in their workplace.
REGULATIONS AIMED AT ALLOCATING LIABILITY FOR CORRUPTION OFFENCES

One area where such right-regulating helps create incentive compatibility
lies in the way that the executive agency allocates liability for non-criminal
cases of corruption. When more than two parties participate in corruption, the
distribution of liability between conspirators and accomplices must be
addressed (as the international conventions mentioned above provide
absolutely no guidance in this area). Corruption often involves only two parties
because incentives are to keep the transaction secret. However, in many
circumstances, bribes are often centralized within the agency, with agents
handing over part or all of the revenue collected to their superiors. 15 Corruption
chains exist in the government involving accessories to a crime (those who
actively collect a share of the bribes) and complicity in a criminal offense (those
who know about corrupt colleagues).
In some cases, the superior can be liable for corruption offenses of

15. For a (somewhat outdated) description of the phenomena in Eastern Europe, see Andras
Sajo, Corruption, Clientelism, and the Future of the Constitutional State in Eastern Europe, 7 E. EUR.
CONST. REv. 37,39-41 (1998).
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subordinates if he or she failed to exercise sufficient oversight. In other words,
if an inspector working at Sofia airport takes a bribe in order to help a naughty
American tourist avoid paying taxes on five cartons of cigarettes, the inspector's
boss would likely be partly responsible for not keeping a closer eye on the
inspector. Yet, even if the superior exercises reasonable oversight over
employees, he or she may still be prosecuted under the various forms of
respondeat superior existing in various legal codes in many of the countries in
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Respondeat superior-an AngloSaxon phrase used to describe a concept that applies to both common law and
civil law legal systems-literally means "let the boss answer (for the offense)."
At first glance, Eastern European countries should obviously punish the bosses
of corrupt civil servants (after all, they were not exercising sufficient oversight
over their employees). Yet the strengthening of respondeat superior would have
negative effects on the level of detected corruption. On the one hand, increased
senior responsibility provides senior officials with more incentives to detect and
prevent corruption. On the other hand, criminal sanctions imposed against the
senior official make him or her less likely to investigate vigorously (as he or she
would also face penalties).
These two contradicting factors can be analysed using economics. Figure 4
shows the amount of detection effort and the value of such effort. 16 Panel (a)
shows increasing marginal costs of engaging in detection efforts, since the
principal shares criminal liability with the agent. Marginal benefits decrease as
the probability of finding cases of corruption falls -with
more and more furtive
glances over the shoulders of the boss' employees helps prevent potential cases
before they become serious. Given some level of marginal costs and benefits,
superiors will exert an optimal level (or quantity) of detection effort-given at
17
Qi-at some particular social cost and benefit (described in the Figure as pl).
Panel (b) depicts the situation-still contrary to the administrative traditions of
most of the countries in the region-where superiors may face less (or no)
liability in cases where they found corruption in their own staff. In such a case,
the overall cost of detection decreases and the level of detection effort increases
from Qi to Q2 as the marginal costs of detecting corruption fall for all levels of
detection effort. 18 A more forgiving policy toward public sector principals can have
16. The economic analysis of anti-corruption work remains controversial (on the grounds that
the main function of law remains to promote justice, with only a weak consideration of the cost
involved). For readers interested in the economic analysis of corruption, see generally Bruce L.
Benson & John Baden, The Political Economy of Governmental Corruption: The Logic of Underground
Government, 14 J.LEGAL STUD. 391 (1985). Naturally, Becker remains the canonical reference for this
kind of analysis. See generally Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.OF
POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
17. For reasons that are too lengthy and tangential to my argument, I will not explain why the
social marginal cost of detecting corruption in theory (and possibly even in practice) equals the
marginal social benefit. The reader may consult the final chapters of any basic microeconomics
textbook for such a rationale. The representation (and quantification) of a level or quantity of
detection effort also represents a potential problem for such a simple analysis. Skeptical readers
may refer to authors cited below such as Shavell and Polinsky. See infra at note 27.
18. In cases of partial administrative indemnification where the superior would still face some
sanction (though softer than currently the case), the superior's marginal cost curve would also shift
out. As a result, further detection effort would also shift out the superior's marginal benefit curvemaking further detection effort more beneficial. As such a situation does not change the "message"
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the counter-intuitiveeffect of decreasing corruption.

Figure 4: Optimal Public Sector Principals' Effort in Detection Corruption Offences
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Thus, executive agencies in many of the countries in the region should
establish a regulatory list test establishing when a superior (or colleague) mayto the social profit-escape the punishment inherent in his or her administrative
relationship
with a corrupt
Figure 5: A Two Part Complicity
official.
The
international
Test for Administrative Corruption
conventions take an unclear
Cases
position on the exact extent to
which the failure to monitor
1. Did the accused accomplice
subordinates (or even other
(superiour) likely know about the
colleagues) constitutes punishable
corrupt transaction(s) of his or her subcomplicity. As shown in Figure 4,
ordinates?
provisions providing for an
escape from the liability inherent
2. Did corruption by the accomplices'
in a principal-agent (or duty of
sub-ordinates result in significant
care) relationship may result in
harms to individuals not party to the
more anti-corruption detection
corrupt transaction (or expose such
effort by civil servants. Yet civil
individuals to such harms)?
servants of any rank should not
obtain blanket immunity from prosecution (as Figure 4 also shows that passing
through some liability may increase the superior's marginal benefits of exerting
detection effort).
A legal test should be in place at the regulatory level to determine whether
an individual's detection effort qualifies for exclusion from a disciplinary or
administrative prosecution. 19 Figure 5 shows the two basic ingredients for such
of Figure 4, I leave out these details to keep the argument simple.
19. Such a test would only apply to disciplinary or administrative prosecutions, as criminal
cases follow already well-defined rules of procedure.
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a regulatory test. The first part of the test establishes whether the superior
exerted sufficient effort in detecting corruption among his or her subordinates
(or peers). If the superior likely knew about the corruption of his or her
subordinates, then the person clearly either served as a direct accomplice or
engaged in an inefficient level of detection effort (thus being guilty of
negligence). 20 The second ingredient in the test-a typical harms test-basically
establishes jurisdiction over the person's case. If the accomplice (the superior)
proved negligent (as exercising insufficient detection effort) and that negligence
resulted in serious harm to others or the agency with which he or she works,
then criminal or civil liability ensues. 21 Regulatory jurisdiction (and thus the
test contained in Figure 5) would clearly be unavailable to members of the
agency's disciplinary committee if significant harm ensued from the superior's
lack of detection effort.
Regulatory jurisdiction-and the jurisdiction of corruption cases in generalserves as one of the key drivers of the marginal costs and benefits of anticorruption work in Eastern Europe. As shown in the first section of this paper,
the international conventions-with their stress on the criminalization of
corruption-have proved ineffective in fighting corruption. In the second
section, I argued that anti-corruption law-regulations in particular, but
legislation as well-should result in excess social benefits (compared with the
costs of writing and enforcing anti-corruption law). In this third section, I
tackled a specific legal concept (complicity and the responsibility of a civil
servant's superiors) in order to show how regulation that takes into
consideration regulatory costs and benefits can lead to more effective anticorruption work in Eastern Europe. Throughout the article, I have discussed
the non-criminal investigation and prosecution of corruption (and the
regulations that may support such a process). What determines whether a
corruption case should be classified as a criminal-rather than administrative or
disciplinary-offense?
AGAINST CRIMINALIZATION? JURISDICTION FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION OFFENCES

The international conventions against corruption as embodied in the United
Nations, Council of Europe and Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") have increasingly pushed for the criminalization of

20. The word "likely" in the test poses difficulties for any disciplinary committee. In practice,
the committee might use a two step approach to establish likely guilt. First, the committee would
establish the optimal level of detection effort (naturally in approximate and qualitative terms)
provided by the incentives the superior faced. Second, if the superior had incentives to engage in a
relatively high level of detection effort, then the disciplinary committee should establish guilt based
on what the Anglo-Saxons refer to as the "balance of probabilities." Under a balance of
probabilities test, if the accused accomplice had a 51% probability (as judged by the disciplinary
committee) of knowing about the corruption of his or her subordinates, then the accused would be
found guilty of negligence.
21. As in cases of theft or other offenses, a particular level of harm often determines whether an
offense is statutorily defined as criminal or civil. The most obvious measure of harm in cases
involving bribery consists of the financial value of the bribe involved. In the early stages of using
this test, judges and administrators may interpret the phrase "significantly adversely" and, over
time, embody their deliberations in the anti-corruption law as a threshold level.
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bribery and corruption. Such a push for criminalization stems from the
common practice among developed OECD countries with effective judicial
systems to treat corruption as a crime. However, in countries with weak
judicial systems, the criminalization of corruption offenses (as imposed by these
international conventions) poses serious problems for successfully prosecuting
corruption offences. 22 Criminal cases require extensive (and expensive)
investigation by the police and/or prosecutor's office (depending on the
country). Yet, these government services severely lack budgetary resourcesand high levels of corruption in their judicial system further reduces the
likelihood of successful prosecutions of corruption in other sectors. Moreover,
(as previously discussed) as superiors are legally and administratively
responsible for the corrupt activities of their subordinates, high-level officials
have been unwilling to strenuously investigate complaints about corruption-in
order to avoid prosecution themselves!
Two other arguments militate against the blanket criminalization of
corruption in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. First, the amount of
proof required for a successful criminal conviction reduces the range of cases
that criminal investigators pursue. Many times, investigators decline cases
because they do not believe that they will be able to collect enough evidence to
convince a court beyond a reasonable doubt about the suspect's guilt.
Administrative sanctions against corruption based on a balance of probabilities
standard for successful conviction can, in certain circumstances, provide greater
deterrence against corruption than the ostensibly stronger criminal standard,
which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 23 Second, by increasing the
penalties for bribery, criminalization can increase the equilibrium bribe
payment. Obviously, bribees need to "price in" the additional costs they face if
they should be detected (in serving prison time). Less obviously, once a bribe
has been offered, the civil servant bribee can blackmail the briber up to the
point where the bribe paid equals the money value of criminal sanctions against
the briber. In many cases, a suspect will pay any amount to avoid serving a jail
24
sentence in a Tbilisi, Vilnius, or Budapest prison.
The difficulty of prosecuting corruption under a criminal burden of proofas well as the large number of mitigating circumstances (which corrupt civil
servant defendants can use as reasonable and reliable defenses)-suggests that
other jurisdictions may provide higher benefit and lower cost venues for
adjudicating corruption related cases. 25 Figure 6 shows three levels of potential
22. Some authors paint a rosier picture of the role of the anti-corruption conventions in
changing legal approaches to fighting corruption. See Steven Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation,
Institutional Change, and TransnationalBribery, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 657,660 (2000).
23. For years (and particularly inspired by the UK's treatment of corruption), legal scholars
have considered the relaxation or reversal of the burden of proof in corruption cases. See generally
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Presumed Guilty: Balancing Competing Rights and Interests in Combating Economic
Crimes, 40 INT'L LAW. 909 (2006).
24. While this paper focuses on the economics of anti-corruption, the economics of corruption
itself has blossomed into a wide and interesting field. For a classical reference, see generally SUSAN
ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUP'FION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM
(Cambridge University Press 1999).
25. Very few legal scholars have focused on secondary or delegated legislation aimed at
fighting corruption. For one notable exception, see Benjamin B. Wagner & Leslie Gielow Jacobs,

[Vol. 36:272

Journalof Legislation

"seriousness" (or responsibility) existing in the law of each country in the
region (albeit in a highly disarticulated form, which appears in different parts
of each country's law). As shown in Figure 6, each level of jurisdiction
("responsibility" in simpler terms) corresponds roughly with the harms (or
potential harms) attendant with each type of corruption-related offense. In
most of the countries in the region, various executive agencies (such as customs,
police, or others) may investigate or deal internally with between five and
twenty cases of corruption per month (naturally Russia as a large country will
deal with more cases than Latvia). Whereas before, internal investigators dealt
with cases themselves (for better or worse), legislative changes in all countries
in the region have resulted in these agencies "passing over" case files to the
criminal investigators. Such legally mandated "passing the buck" may explainin part-why the international conventions are failing to help reduce corruption
in Eastern Europe.
Figure 6: The Harms and Standard of Evidence Required for Corruption
Remedies
Evidence
Types of
Advantages
requirement

remedies

Managerial
(defined in
Agency's Law
or Code)

Suspicion of
corruption,

Administrative
(defined in
Admin Law)

Balance of
probabilities,

Written warning,
reassignment,
pass to
administrative or
criminal levels.
Warning,
reassignment,
fine, firing,

Civil
(defined in
Civil Code)

Depends on
legal tradition.

Failure to prosecute
opens to
administrative and
criminal liability.
Failure to detect large
numbers gives
administrative court
liability, contributory
factors/ accessory to a
crime.

Payment of
damages and
compensation.

Addresses economic
harms, provides for
deterrence that jail
time does not.
Criminal
Beyond a
Fine, censure,
If criminal prosecution
(defined in
reasonable
prison,
does not succeed
Criminal Code) doubt.
(because of corruption
in judiciary), then rely
on two other levels to
obtain partial
prosecution.
Note: For each Code, please see www.legislationline.org.
Criminal investigatorsand prosecutors should only be involved in corruption cases

Retooling Law Enforcement to Investigate and Prosecute Entrenched Corruption: Key Criminal Procedure
Reformsfor Indonesia and Other Nations, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 183 (2009).
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in Eastern Europe when the benefits to society of treating the case as a crime exceed the
26
First, petty corruption cases should not receive the same time and
costs.
resources as grand corruption. Governments, like individuals, face budget
constraints and when their expenditures exceed their income, they go bankrupt.
Second, in a system where over-regulation causes incentives for the majority of
the population to be corrupt, the criminalization of everyone is tantamount to
the creation of a nation of outlaws. Third, "devolving" investigatory and
prosecutorial powers to executive agencies-particularly law enforcement
agencies with already existing legal powers in these areas-can both create anticorruption competencies throughout the government as well as reduce the cost
since an investigator in the Internal Affairs
of anti-corruption work,
Department of Customs is likely to earn less than the Chief Inspector in the
Ministry of Interior.
A proper anti-corruption regulation clearly assigns jurisdiction over
corruption cases to the least-cost, highest-benefit jurisdiction. Managerial
responsibility aims at tackling incentives leading to corruption and small
corruption offenses. Managerial jurisdiction results in cheap investigations,
which require little formality. Administrative responsibility applies a civil law
burden of proof (allowing executive agency's services to deal with high risk
areas of corruption where obtaining proof is difficult or expensive).
Administrative cases can be processed quickly and the relatively light penalties
make bribing administrative judges generally unprofitable. Criminal
responsibility applies all the standard procedures as envisioned in the criminal
code (and to the extent applicable the anti-corruption law).
Yet, because of differences between the social and agency-level harms involved in
corruption cases, strong incentives exist to misallocate jurisdiction over corruption
cases. Figure 7 shows the logic behind the misallocation of cases (a
phenomenon that most actual investigators and prosecutors in Eastern Europe
and the Former Soviet Union complain about often). The heavy upward sloping
line in Figure 7 represents the agency's inherent or "technical" marginal costs of
prosecuting corruption cases. Bigger corruption cases-namely those cases
involving more money or more economic harm-require more investigatory and
prosecutorial resources. Huge cases like the Siemens corruption scandal require
more resources than cases involving small E5 notes slipped to a doctor. To start
even the most basic case requires some investment of resources, labeled as Vo.

26. Many critics would argue that justice has no price. However, these critics often live in
societies whose justice systems are well-financed. In middle and lower-income countries,
unfortunately, economic choices must be made about the ways in which scare resources are used.
The critics' refusal to address the economics of an issue related to justice has resulted in long queues
on court dockets, long waiting times in filthy jails, and a court system concentrating opportunities
for bribe payments around criminal prosecutors and judges.
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Figure 7: The Optimal Division of Corruption Remedies Between Jurisdictions
magnlmarginal

departmental

marginal
costs

I

administrative
Ai/!cos

Quick and
easy prosecution

Optimal level of
prosecution

social
Agency's
(piae
i nasts(prvate)
/' maroinal

Desire to keep it
'in the house"

Corruption comprises an economic activity involving negative economic
externalities. Namely, the social harms arising from corruption exceed the
private harms to individuals or the Agency affected. The Customs Agency may
lose £10 million in collected revenue from under-valuation due to the payment
of bribes, but the economic distortions those bribe cause on other traders (more
efficient traders losing contracts, becoming unable to obtain imported inputs
and so forth) can easily exceed £100 million. Figure 7 shows the gap between
these social and private (namely Agency-level) harms by two upward curving
marginal cost curves. The Agency's managers will want to "take care of" low
value anti-corruption cases themselves because they see that their capacities of
investigation and prosecution equate with the level of harm to the Agency (as
shown by point C1 in Figure 7). At point CI though, the social harms present
much greater losses to society than agency's managers internalize. At the other
extreme, large corruption cases can be tackled by an agency-wide special task
force. As represented at point C2, the agency has probably lost a large amount
of revenue due to a particular case of corruption and seeks either restitution or
at least public recognition for prosecution corruption among its own ranks. Yet,
again, the corruption case generating harms represented by C 2 in Figure 7
represents a case where the agency should turn the case over to criminal
investigators and prosecutors.
Anti-corruption regulation should provide for agency-level jurisdiction
over corruption cases only when their marginal costs equal the social marginal
benefit of prosecuting these cases at the agency-level instead of at the criminal
level. As shown in Figure 7, an administrative level prosecution-involving the
Agency's disciplinary committee or an administrative tribunal hearing-should
ensue when the cost to the administrative instance of hearing the case equals
the harm the case poses to society (and not just the Agency itself). In the case
shown in Figure 7, despite any provisions in the law, managerswill have incentives to
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claim jurisdictionover cases which they should refer to the Internal Affairs Department
(or the relevant Agency-wide disciplinary committee) as well as claim jurisdictionover
cases which should be turned over to the police.
Without the proper form of anti-corruption finance, agencies will not have
the incentives to assign corruption cases to their optimal jurisdiction. 27 As
shown in Figure 7, the disparity between social and agency-level costs and
benefits will prevent agencies from working in the overall interest of the
country. Individuals responsible for fighting corruption in an executive must be
provided with incentives in order to exert sufficient effort in investigating
corruption and/or turning over the case the highest-benefit, lowest-cost
jurisdiction. The social benefits will accrue as additional resources-either in the
form of increased taxes or as the result of confiscated proceeds from corruption.
Clearly, these resources should be allocated in order to encourage (or provide
incentives) for anti-corruption work, leading to a discussion of anti-corruption
finance.
ANTI-CORRUPTION FINANCE: CREATING INCENTIVES TO EXPOSE CORRUPTION

The social benefits of fighting corruption-which translate into financial
benefits like more taxes and the confiscation of the proceeds from corruptionshould be used to encourage further anti-corruption work. At present, anticorruption programs in all the countries in the region are grossly underfinanced. Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland have received large amounts
of (unsustainable) anti-corruption donor assistance. Romania and Bulgaria
have received less (though partly because of the large amounts of other finance
aimed at accession, which would have had indirect impacts on corruption).
Georgia, Armenia and the Russian Federation have funding for a wide-variety
of ad hoc donor supported programs. In all these countries, actual budgetary
allocations of anti-corruption work are usually determined on an historical
basis (looking at last year's budget and adding a bit). Yet none of these
approaches follows an incentive based approach, leaving corruption fighters
with few incentives to go chasing bribe takers. Promising anti-corruption
fighters the same amount of money every year (or a bit more) does not motivate
them to work harder.

27. Authors writing on issues related to the optimal level of law enforcement frequently omit
any discussion of incentives and finance. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Corruptionand Optimal Law Enforcement, 81 J. OF PUB. ECON. 1 (2001).

Figure 8a: The Case for Performance-Based
Anti-Corruption Budgets
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Figure 8b: The Case for Performance-Based
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Theory suggests that performance-based budgeting provides the strongest
incentives for reducing corruption. Figure 8a shows a number of anticorruption budgetary finance rules. The figure shows the structural (or
naturally inherent) relationship between the level of corruption and the
corresponding anti-corruption effort as a heavy downward slopping line and
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three different anti-corruption financing rules. 28 In the case of a fixed budget to
a department (such as the Internal Affairs department of a Ministry of Interior),
the anti-corruption level of effort is fixed by the department's line-item budget
for anti-corruption work. Such funding, depicted as a vertical line, establishes a
fixed level of anti-corruption work-regardless of the level of corruption.
Georgia, Armenia and the Russian Federation represent countries where such
an approach remains dominant. In the case where funding is given based on
political events (a general outcry against corruption) or based on the
administratively perceived need for anti-corruption funding, funding is tied to
a particular level of corruption that may not correspond to the amount of actual
anti-corruption work required in the department. Such funding-depicted as a
horizontal line and labeled as the "political mandate case"-often only occurs at
high levels of corruption (as governments tend not to fund anti-corruption
where no apparent need exists). Lithuania represented an early example of
such an approach (though recently, anti-corruption finance has become more
like the fixed-finance case). Poland, Hungary and Latvia have, depending on
the point in time, have all seen anti-corruption budgetary allocations wax and
wane with popular perceptions of corruption (with relatively little impact on
reducing actual corruption).
Tying anti-corruption budgets to performance helps allocate resources to
agencies which can best use them.29 Figure 8b shows an example of such a rule
and the optimal level of anti-corruption effort for an agency working on
fighting corruption. A performance-based finance rule would provide funds to
agencies to the extent that they demonstrated that they have reduced
corruption (thus the negative slope of the line). Clearly, when anti-corruption
investigators or other law enforcement officials are able to reduce more
corruption (per unit of effort) than the resources they require as part of their
salary, they should receive more funding (as represented by a steeper sloping
structural trade-off line as compared with the money given by the performancebudget rule). When these corruption busters receive more compensation (per
unit of effort), then the value they generate in corruption busted, then they
should receive marginally less funding. Clearly, the intersection of each
financing rule with the structural trade-off determines the equilibrium level of
corruption and anti-corruption. Under the assumptions of the simple model
presented in Figure 8, a performance-based budgeting rule will result in the
highest amount of long-run, sustainable anti-corruption effort. 30 In this case,
28. The downward sloping heavy set line represents a structural relationship (or overall
technical efficiency) gauging the extent to which cops on streets, public auditors slouched over
desks, and others help dissuade people from engaging in corruption or help prosecute them. For
the purposes of this article, such "technical efficiency" represents know-how, skills, and other
exogenously given non-incentive based attributes.
29. Increasing evidence suggests that law enforcement officials respond to high powered
incentives they are given. See Luciana Echazu & Nuno Garoupa, Corruption and the Distortion of Law
Enforcement Effort, AM. L. AND ECON. REV. ADVANCE ACCESS, January 4, 2010, 17-18, available at
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/ahp02Ovl.
30. While a discussion of comparative statics involving Figure 8 extends beyond the bounds of
this paper, the reader can see that the slope of the financial rule between corruption and anticorruption must be greater than the slope of the structural trade-off between these two variables (in
order to guarantee continued investment in anti-corruption).

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 36:272

over time, funding is expected to converge to the level corresponding with the
structural trade-off. In practice, in all the countries in Central Europe and the
Former Soviet Union, governments follow the opposite logic - restrictingfunding as
anti-corruptionwork becomes more successful (on the grounds the problem is less
pressing relative to other problems). Such funding rules provide anti-corruption
departments with incentives to avoid fighting corruption (and in theory to contribute to
31
corruption).
Qui tam rewards serve as another example where anti-corruption regulation
may lead to strong incentives to fight corruption. 32 Qui tam legal provisions,
which allow any individual to sue the government on behalf of the interests of
the government, serve as a bounty for corrupt officials and businessmen. 33 The
reward for individuals reporting cases of corruption would be related to the
benefit to society (known as the social benefit) that such qui tam denouncement
produce. For example, suppose a police officer offers to "ignore" a driving
offence commitment by a middle-aged Russian woman driver on the streets of
Moscow in exchange for £40 (the offense could be real or a false rent-seeking
accusation). How much money should the Russian state pay the woman to
denounce the police officer (called GAI-ishnik in Russian because the letters for
the traffic police are GAI)? Clearly the reward needs to be sufficient enough for
the woman to risk her safety (in fear of potential retaliation by the GAI-ishnik).
Figure 9 shows that the woman can be offered up to a sum (£23,540), which at
first glance seems exorbitant given the miniscule £40 bribe requested by the
GAI-ishnik. While the numbers in the example portrayed in Figure 9 are
examples (used only for the sake of illustration), they demonstrate a simple idea
from economic theory-that the social benefits of fighting corruption
significantly exceed private (or individual) costs to contributing to the fight
against corruption. If individuals could share part of that social benefit (as
personal compensation), then strong incentives would produce a much larger
volume of investigations and prosecutions in the countries in the region.

31. In many OECD member countries (particularly the ones with relatively low levels of
corruption), government departments-through budgetary bargaining, outsourcing and other
methods-have some tie (albeit relatively weak) between the contribution their anti-corruption
efforts make to the state budget and their budgetary allocation for the year. Such a mechanism
represents an indirect "bounty" system such as the one discussed more directly in the text.
32. I treat the issue of qui tam as a regulatory issue rather than as a legislative issue for two
reasons. First, most EU member states politically find qui tam unpalatable-excluding the possibility
of qui tam friendly legislation in the near future. As such, a regulatory "surrogate" (relying on
legislative provisions that would offer regulators room for maneuvering) would be the best present
strategy for adopting qui tam-like instruments in the EU. Second, in many EU member states, a set
of rewards and benefits can be discretionarily conferred at the executive agency level which would
replicate a qui tam reward.
33. The actual effect of these bounties will depend on the extent to which corrupt officials and
businessmen can "price in" the bounty and the increased probability of being caught during the
bribe negotiations. If they can pass through these costs, then qui tam provisions may only serve to
further redistribute income instead of lead to a reduction in the incidence of bribery. For a game
theoretic discussion of the design of such a system, see Robert Cooter & Nuno Garoupa, The
Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes And Other Cooperative Crimes 13 (2 Berk. L. &
Econ. Working Papers, 2000), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/83c0k3we.
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Figure 9: Calculating the Social Gain of a Qui Tam Accusation by
a Muscovite Woman against a GAI-chik
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How much money should the government of Lithuania, Hungary, or
Russia (among others) pay denouncers of corruption as qui tam rewards? Figure
10 illustrates the logic more fully. 34 Panel 10(a) shows-on a simple line-the
costs and benefits involved in a simple bribery case in which a third-party
denounces a corrupt official in exchange for a reward. The panel shows the
bribe level (on a line such that positions to the right represent higher bribe
amounts) and the corresponding amount of social harm. For example, a person
bribing a customs officer may pay £100, which causes E600 in harm to other
businesspeople (who lose sales). Panel (b) shows a reward level that is higher
than the whistle-blower's costs (such a reward must always be higher,
otherwise the whistle-blower has no incentive to denounce corruption). For
example, of the £100 bribe, the denouncer may receive £80 and cost the
denouncer £40 in time and effort to find and report this incidence of bribery. At
the level of rewards and costs portrayed in panel (b), the loss to society of
corruption is represented only by the denouncer's costs (as the other harms are
recoupable). The denouncer's profit is represented by the difference between
the reward level and the denouncer's costs. The government compensates the
victims directly harmed by the corrupt act-representing a gain to these victims
(as society now avoids this social harm and possesses the extra resources in
order to make these compensations). Parties who are indirectly harmed will
benefit from the discontinuation of corruption (as shown by the area shown in

34. The use of qui tam legal provisions to provide high-powered incentives to fight corruption
remain one of the most exciting research areas of anti-corruption policy. See generally Aaron Petty,
Note, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public Corruption,39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 851 (2006).
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Panel 8(b) as "gain to third parties") as £500 in this particular example.

Figure 10: The Optimal Theoretical Qui Tam Award in Corruption Cases
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In cases where the reward requested by the denouncer exceeds the amount
of money involved in the bribe transaction, some victims who are indirectly
harmed will have incentives to make a Pareto-improving payment to the
denouncer. 35 In panel (c), the denouncer's costs are less than the bribe paid,
though the reward is much higher. Thus, the denouncer may incur £80 in costs
(for example) and receive a reward of £200 (which is less than the £600 in
overall harm to all producers). As a result; part of the denouncer's bounty will
be paid by individuals directly harmed by the bribe and partly by individuals
indirectly harmed. However, because the reward is less than the overall gain
accruing to third-parties, some of these third-parties will benefit. 36 Panel (d)
depicts the situation where the denouncer's costs are higher than the amount
involved in the bribe transaction. For example, the denouncer may incur £200
in costs and receive £400 in rewards, though only £300 in bribes was paid. In
this case, as long as the reward paid is less than the value of the overall harm to
society, third-parties will benefit by contributing to the denouncer's bounty. In
this case, third-parties (or society as a whole) compensate the denouncer and
37
third-parties gain less than when smaller rewards are paid.

35. In theory, individuals who are indirectly harmed will make Pareto-improving payments to
the denouncer. Usually in practice, however, these third-parties are completely disassociated with
the corruption case (and often unable to understand the harms that they experience). Thus,
compensation to the denouncer based on overall social gain comes from the government budget. In
theory, third-parties who are most harmed by bribery would be those parties most willing to pay
compensation to the denouncer. However, even in theory, the policymaker will, only with extreme
difficulty, predict which third-parties will benefit most from the discontinuation of corruption (and
ask for contributions from these specific individuals).
36. In theory, in the presence of low transaction costs, third-parties who are harmed by
corruption can form a coalition or class-action in order to divide the gains relatively equally
amongst themselves.
37. As an interesting aside, in the case where no detection or prevention is attempted, the bribe
represents a simple redistribution of resources between briber and bribed (thus no economic loss
occurs, except for the harms to third-parties). In the case where a bounty-hunter attempts to collect
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Figure 10 continued: The Optimal Theoretical Qui Tam Award in Corruption Cases
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In cases where the reward is set too high, it can distort incentives, causing
qui tam provisions to do more economic harm than good. Panel (e) shows the
case where the reward paid to the denouncer is higher than the direct or
indirect harms of bribery. In this case, the government must use resources from
other activities in order to compensate the denouncer, resulting potentially in
lower social returns to other activities. Because the denouncer will have an
opportunity cost (such as working in a company), the reward could distort the
individual's incentives, resulting in this individual moving away from other
productive activity.

Figure 10 continued: The Optimal Theoretical Qui Tam Award in Corruption Cases
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Effective anti-corruption regulations provide the same kinds of incentives
to civil servants to denounce corruption (and to increase work effort aimed at
investigating corruption). However, paying civil servants to do their duty
potentially creates negative incentives within the public sector because of the
a reward, his or her costs represent a efficiency-decreasing transaction cost.
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two negative effects describes in panel (e), namely distorting the civil servant's
time and government resources. As discussed above though, it is possible to
design a compensation package which provides blunted financial incentives (in
the form of promotion or perquisites) without diminishing incentives to comply
with work obligations. Thus, the optimal high-powered incentive scheme aimed at
encouragingcivil servants to actively fight corruption blunts the incentives paid to civil
servants to the point where the temptation to divert one's time and government
resources into the investigation and prosecution of corruption offences that have low
38
expected return are minimized.
PUTTING IT DOWN ON PAPER: DRAFTING AGENCY ANTI-CORRUPION
REGULATIONS FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
All of the issues presented in this paper can be brought together in an
Eastern European executive agency's regulations that implement the national
anti-corruption law (and thus the CoE, UN and OECD international
conventions against corruption). National legislation provides general
principles and guidelines that the police, customs, minister of health and other
executive agencies must implement. For example, according to legislation in
place in all the countries in the region, executive agencies must provide mutual
assistance to other countries in international corruption cases. However,
national legislation purposely leaves a large amount of regulatory discretion to
executive agencies to implement each article of anti-corruption law as they see
fit.39
Anti-corruption regulations-like the legislation that provides the overarching principles for such regulation writing-should strike a balance between
defining more clearly the operating methods of implementing legislation and
the constraints those regulations pose on an agency's staff in taking bribes (or
engaging in corruption). Figure 11a shows the way in which these two effects
determine the level of anti-corruption regulations in a country (taking a
relatively low corruption OECD member state as an example). In the figure, as
executive agencies pass more and more pages of anti-corruption regulations,
the cost per page falls (the as the main issues can be tackled in a few pages).
Additional pages (or separate instructions) serve to "tighten the screws"
around civil servants-constraining them less and less and reducing less
corruption on the margin. Figure 11a depicts these downward sloping marginal

38. The optimal payment, which will be less than the equilibrium payment that equals the
private plus social costs imposed by a particular corrupt transaction, will clearly depend on the civil
servant's income elasticity of labor supply and the extent to which the civil servant internalizes the
externality through a public service motivation or altruism. For empirical estimates of such a public
service motivation, see Philip E. Crewson, A ComparativeAnalysis of Public and Private Sector Entrant
Quailty, 39 AM. J.OF POL. So. 628, 636 (1995). Such a payment will necessarily reduce the resources
available to compensate victims of corruption crimes and other corruption offenses.
39. I use the term "anti-corruption law" because the various pieces of legislation governing the
ways that a country fights against corruption vary enormously across countries. Countries such as
Latvia and Lithuania, for example, rely mainly on a specific anti-corruption piece (as a single piece
of legislation). Other countries, such as Russia (until recently) have relied on various legal
provisions scattered across the Criminal Code, Administrative Code, Public Procurement Law, and
various other pieces of legislation.
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costs as MC 1. On the other hand, more pages of anti-corruption regulations add
precision, outline complicated procedures for tackling corruption and can even
serve as a useful surrogate for legislation (when such legislation is extremely
vague). Figure 11a shows these upward sloping marginal benefits as the curve
MB,. Naturally, an executive agency will write anti-corruption regulations
until the cost per page (or instruction) of writing these regulations equals the
benefit in fighting corruption. In other words, the marginal costs of regulation
equal the marginal benefits at an optimal "quantity" (as measured in pages,
number of instructions or some proxy measuring the quality of regulation
writing) depicted in the figure as QOECD.

Figure Ila: Passing a New Law: Effects on Anti-Corruption Regulations
for an OECD Country
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For OECD member countries (countries with already relatively low levels
of corruption), the effects of passing more anti-corruption laws only causes
agencies to rewrite their already existing regulations. The marginal benefits of
their present regulations decrease (as the guidance offered by legislation
replaces the guidance to officers previously offered by Agency-level
regulation). Figure 11a shows such an effect as a shifting in of the marginal cost
curve to MB2. However, the costs to the Agency of their regulations on the
books increases as new regulations come into force that replace the "tired and
true" ways these agencies developed over decades to fight particular types of
corruption in their ranks. While the exact effect on the "stock" (or "quantity")
of regulations will depend on particular details, the level of regulations should
stay about the same. In my own reviews of regulations from police departments
in the USA, France and the UK, after the wave of legislative changes took place
in the early part of the 2000s, the predictions of Figure 11a seem relatively
sound.
For countries in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (such as
Georgia, Armenia, Hungary and so forth), the quantity also remains the samebecause of Agency budget constraints. Figure 11b shows the quantity of anticorruption regulations and the costs and benefits of adjusting to legislative
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changes in these Eastern European and Former Soviet countries.
Anticorruption legislation in the countries in the region (with the exception of
perhaps Romania) is more abstract and less well-defined than in other
countries. These laws tend to be shorter, the wording more diffuse and the
principles (while often the same), stated in more ambiguous language. As such,
the marginal benefit of anti-corruption regulations should increase as new anticorruption legislation passes the Duma (Russia), Seimas (Lithuania),
Orszdggyfil~s (Hungary) and so forth. Figure 11b shows the optimal level of
anti-corruption regulation in the region at QEE/Fsu-well above the optimal level
in OECD member countries. Legal departments should have the incentives to
work vigorously on new and more specific anti-corruption regulations.
However, because of rigidities in legal institutions in many of the countries in the
region, the quantity of anti-corruption regulations remains well below the optimal
level-or even completely unchanged. In theory, the marginal costs of engaging in
anti-corruption regulation should fall because of "better" legislation. However,
in practice, most Eastern European states (and particular those in the Former
Soviet Union) leave regulations in place. Their legal departments function
poorly (if at all) and staff working in these legal departments have no incentives
to draft revised regulations (given broader problems with the public sector pay
and promotion framework). As such, marginal costs should-hypotheticallyshift inward (as shown by the MChypothetical line). In practice, though, the
equilibrium level of regulation, in the absence of resource constraints and
responding only to incentives, would be at Q*. However, these countries have,
in practice, a much lower "quantity" of anti-corruption regulations. A visit to a
customs office in Tbilisi, Riga, or St. Petersburg will reveal regulations
consisting of only a few pages and written in very informal language.
Naturally, the necessary regulations remain poorly written (or unwritten)
because legal staff (what few work in the agency) are not paid enough. In other
words, resource constraints keep the level of anti-corruption regulations at
Qconstrain.

Figure 11b: Passing a New Law: Effects on Anti-Corruption Regulations
for an Eastern European Agency
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The suggestions made in this paper should, in part, help the countries in
the region raise their anti-corruption regulations toward the optimal level. In
the first part of the paper, I looked at the types of "value-subtracting"
regulations and proposed the adoption primarily of welfare-improving
regulations. The second section looked at ways of improving compliance with
anti-corruption regulations through designing incentive compatible regulations
(particularly those that allocate legal liability for corruption offenses at the noncriminal level). The third section looked at cases where the agency specifically
should adopt the regulations described in Figure 11. The agency should,
following the thesis provided in this paper, be assigned jurisdiction over a noncriminal corruption case when the social benefits outweigh the costs. The
fourth section noted that providing agency-level anti-corruption fighters with
the incentives to investigate and prosecute cases requires finance tied to
performance. Namely, an agency's budget for fighting corruption (whether in
the form of salaries to members of an Internal Affairs unit or simply for printing
posters) should be tied to the spending agency's effectiveness at fighting
corruption. Rewards can incentivize civil servants as well as private citizens-as
seen in the case of qui tam rewards. Through incentive-based mechanisms, the
countries in the Eastern European and Former Soviet region can improve the
regulatory quality (and quantity) of their anti-corruption instructions, orders,
and decrees.
CONCLUSIONS

Through incentive-based mechanisms, many countries in Eastern Europe
and the Former Soviet Union can improve the regulatory quality (and quantity)
of their anti-corruption instructions, orders, and decrees. 40 Regulations should
create social value instead of simply adding "busy work." Fewer police,
customs officers, doctors and other executive agency staff will take bribes if
they are exposed to greater legal liability and if they have other financial
deterrents. Executive agencies in countries like Russia, Bulgaria, and Armeniaand the other countries in the region-should take greater jurisdiction over noncriminal corruption cases. Keeping the processing "in-house" can significantly
lower costs and raise financial collections (as well as mitigate social harms) of
corruption affecting these agencies. These agencies should be allocated budgets
to fight corruption-not based on the amount of money they received the
previous year-but based on their proven efficiency at "catching bad guys" (or
preventing incentives from arising that creates these bad guys in the first place).
Qui tam rewards offer one example of a mechanism that can use economic
incentives to dissuade bribe-taking by customs officers, traffic police and other
members of executive agencies. While the 1990s and 2000s represented a
40. Such a view hopes to make a contribution to the literature by diverting attention away from
strictly legislative changes. For an excellent analysis of such changes occurring in the Eastern
European and Former Soviet region, see Beverley Earle, Bribery and Corruption in Eastern Europe, the
Baltic States, and the Commonwealth of Independent States: What is to be Done?, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
483,492-509 (2000).
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beginning for anti-corruption regulation, many countries in the region will
need to do much more work to adopt the instructions, decrees, orders and other
regulations needed to implement national anti-corruption laws and actually
fight corruption.

